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Remarks to the AFCEA TechNet International 2004 Conference “Combating Emerging Threats”

Washington, DC Convention Center

Tuesday, 11 May 04

Thank you very much, Herb [VADM Herbert Browne, (USN, ret), President and CEO AFCEA International], for that kind introduction. I really would like to thank Herb for his great leadership in AFCEA. You and your organization have done a great job of tying military and industry professionals together so we're all working from the same sheet of music. That's really very important for transforming our military. And that's critical to winning the War on Terrorism.

Last January I addressed a similar AFCEA group at a luncheon in San Diego, some of you might remember. However, it was a “virtual” address, a first for me. Now, this year, I have the good fortune to get to eat a “real lunch.” Real lunches are better than “virtual lunches,” I'll guarantee you that.

Our virtual discussion last winter demonstrated one of our Nation's greatest advantages, that's our Command and Control capability. Or more specifically, our C4BA capabilities – command, control, communications, computers and battlespace awareness – these elements define how we operate and fight together.

Now, you'll notice that I am using the term “Battlespace Awareness” instead of “ISR,” [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], and I've done that before. I'm not sure if Battlespace Awareness is the best term, but I'll tell you, I don't think that there's a distinct enough difference between the terms I-S-and-R anymore. I believe that's “old think,” personally. They're not really helpful as we try to define our own current strategic environment.

What I'm going to be talking to you is from my view, and I'm probably talking at thirty thousand feet. Some of you out here are probably at a hundred feet, doing what you do best. I don't know one percent of what you do, but I'm going to give you the thirty thousand foot view. So, that's where I'm coming from.

I do know that our global environment today is dramatically different from a decade or two. We're in this dynamic, challenging world. We all know that. We are engaged in an Asymmetric war with terrorists, who present a very different threat from our Cold War adversaries. Terrorists are agile, non-state actors who deliberately, kill innocent men, women and children. And we can't afford to underestimate them or their capabilities.

Terrorists and their Islamic extremist supporters are also, unfortunately, not as predictable as some of our old foes, like the Soviet Union. Terrorist attacks are often labeled “Asymmetric Warfare,” meaning they're not a traditional force-on-force. We won't be squaring off in huge World War II style Armor battles against them. If we want to maintain our way of life, our basic freedoms, we will remain vulnerable to attack, at least to some degree.

But, the situation is not completely grim. We don't adhere to Napoleonic concepts of warfare anymore. We have our own Asymmetric Advantage. Our Nation's power to disrupt and destroy terrorists and those who support them really does rely on our Command and Control, and all the moving pieces in our Battlespace Awareness systems. It comes down to our capability to turn information into action, virtually across the globe. That's our “Asymmetric Advantage.”

Some might argue that our precision weapons capability is our big advantage. Others say it's our training and our excellent and motivated Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coastguardsmen, DoD civilians, and industry civilian partners over in Iraq and Afghanistan are really our edge. I'd agree with all of that – it's all absolutely true. But, the critical link that holds it all together is our Command and Control. That's the link.

Ultimately, all our efforts rely on our ability to communicate and share information. Using information to integrate our actions between agencies, between services, between Nations, which allows us to have a coherent strategy and make the best and fastest decisions. On one hand, Command and Control acts like glue ... and I've used this before, in fact I've used props and they've asked me not to use props anymore ... holding together large organizations and operations. And on the other hand, it acts like caulk, filling the gaps between stovepipes in our capabilities, between commands, between organizations and missions.

I believe this Asymmetric Advantage sets us apart from today's and tomorrow's threats, from terrorists and from rogue

states. But for all our strengths, we still have plenty of problems to fix, many of which you've addressed today and you'll address tomorrow. And we have lots of work to do if we're going to maintain our edge.

I'm sure you remember during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when the media reported that the Coalition was bogged-down. I think "quagmire" was the sound bite. It was during one of the worst sandstorms the region had seen in many years. But in reality, during that sandstorm, Coalition forces effectively decimated two Iraqi divisions.

The Iraqi troops had thought they were invisible, but they were of course wrong. They were so demoralized that many just ran away. Iraqi battalions dissolved one after the other. Iraqi generals, as well as some of the media, didn't understand our capabilities. The advanced technology developed by many of you in this room helped create what looked like magic.

Though our Coalition forces did well in IRAQI FREEDOM and against that particular enemy we still have plenty of room for improvement in areas like combat ID, intelligence gathering and sharing, common operating picture and many, many other areas. And I'm sure, in any one of those areas, you know much more about it than I'll ever know.

Many of these challenges are being resolved with technical solutions, as we continue our military transformation. But, in addition to using new technologies, we're shattering some old Cold War attitudes and developing new concepts and relationships.

I've found – and I think many of us on the Joint Chiefs have found – that from planning to execution, the realities of this new global environment require us to harmonize and synchronize our diplomatic, economic, informational and military actions. We have to engage at many levels: Between agencies, between services, between allies and also non-governmental organizations and industry partners. We're moving from an era of "Joint Warfighting," and that term was good until several years ago, where services would fight together, to "Integrated Warfare," where we'll tie many Coalition partners and all of our instruments of national power together. When I say warfare, I'm talking about the most extreme case. For instance, it could be a situation like in Haiti – a peacekeeping operation – or in Liberia. But I'll always use the worst case, which is the hardest, and that is warfare.

For most of us we'll find, and this is my view from thirty thousand feet, that this is a new way of thinking, for military and the defense industry as well. That means going beyond old stovepipes is what we need to do. For example, I recently saw the space systems engineering chart for a large defense industry partner. A very nice organizational chart. I may tell you which company it was later. It has the same stovepipes we saw 30 years ago: strategic systems, theater missile defense, and so on and so on. They generally follow the old "I-S-R" terminology – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Once upon a time, those were good terms and meant specific functions. But as I said earlier, now I think they're becoming blurred and frankly obsolete. Yet, we tend to perpetuate those terms because that's how we grew up.

A good place to start to see if you're thinking in the way we need to think for this new century is to go and get your phone book and see how you describe yourselves. See how integrated you look ... or how broken apart your various disciplines are. Maybe they're that way because that's how you've always done it and not because it's the best way to organize to meet the threats of today and tomorrow. We're all victim to our sentimentality. That's why I think that "Battlespace Awareness" is better than "ISR." I think that the key is considering the entire battlespace, in a holistic sense. It might mean thinking about the entire globe as a battlespace in some situations.

I think we could also benefit from re-evaluating the terms "tactical" and "strategic" or "national." Those terms aren't very useful anymore. They allow certain people to reserve assets for particular functions. That's not how our business works. What we use to call national or strategic information could be interesting to the President but it also could be interesting to a private. I've seen that lately. You have a situation on the ground where the President needs to know something, but a Private needs to know something close to it, and the information has strategic implications.

Another problem within these legacy stovepipes involves who decides what information the warfighting commander normally sees ... or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for that matter. How many intel officers do we have here? Anyone admit to that? For the most part, we get the information the intel community deems important and in the format they want to present it. But information "pull" is often much more appropriate, more formatted to what an individual needs to see. We've got to have a system that flexibly allows this to happen.

As you all know, advanced technology has really shrunken the globe, both in distance and in time. Speed of action is no longer determined by a commander's bold guess like it was in Napoleon's time. Our organizations and our culture, our ways of thinking, have to change with the technology.

Take missile defense, for example. In the 90s, we had “theater” and “national” missile defense systems. But, there was always overlap and the line was very arbitrary. A Theater Missile Defense system for America could simultaneously be a National Missile Defense system for our allies, such as Japan. This arbitrary distinction was confusing and inaccurate.

So, today our new missile defense concept encompasses all missile threats from the pre-launch segment to the terminal segment. Breaking down old stovepipes will undoubtedly increase our speed and flexibility in missile defense and it'll be the same with our other capabilities too.

So, I mentioned a company whose organization charts still reflected some of those stovepipes from the previous century. I know everyone is getting nervous out there? Well, I'm not going to name the company because we're all dealing with the same thing. It's hard to change successful, big organizations, whether in the military or a defense company. We may need to develop new organizations to keep our Asymmetric Advantage intact, to exploit the tremendous new technologies many of you here are developing.

One example of this kind of new organization is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters. The Standing Joint Force Headquarters is a joint, cross-functional team of approximately 60 service members who operate on a Combatant Commander's staff in peacetime, training and maintaining awareness of crisis regions and hot points in their area of responsibility. And they'll be ready to form the core of the commander's operations center starting day one of a particular crisis. The concept is to have at least one Standing Joint Headquarters per combatant command. And as a crisis begins to emerge, the Regional combatant commander will point to this team to establish the Joint Task Force Headquarters. They'll tailor and scale it to the situation.

Members of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters could be sent forward to a combat zone to provide a forward headquarters. Or the combatant commander can send some forward and leave others back home for “reachback.” They'll obviously have to have an excellent communications suite to have a smaller footprint forward.

What it really should help us do, though, is reduce the *ad hoc* nature of establishing Joint Headquarters and help make information sharing between organizations much more seamless because they'll have a common suite of equipment they'll be trained on and every game won't be a “pick-up” game. Some of you know very much what I'm talking about. Think about Afghanistan and Iraq today, and other places in the world.

In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the operations centers in Southwest Asia and Tampa were all sharing common information. They had a pretty decent common operations picture, but it was in fact a custom system, and very expensive. And, you could argue that we had about a decade to practice, plus the fresh experience from our operations in Afghanistan.

In the future, clearly we're going to be called upon to react faster with less time to get ready. We need to have equipment and people ready on day one, trained to work with other agencies, other nations and our best equipment ready to go.

Standing Joint Force Headquarters are a paradigm shift for Command and Control. We're moving from hand-crafted one-of-a-kind Command and Control systems, and I bet a lot of you in this room have participated in building these, usually manned by a “pick-up” team moving to modular, scalable architectures with trained professionals resident in regional combatant commands.

Another key to sustaining our Asymmetric Advantages in Command and Control is to use smart automation to enable better and faster decision-making, because as we know, the human factor is often the slowest but also most important link in the C2 Chain. If you think about how we do time-sensitive-targeting. That includes finding, investigating and perhaps attacking targets that an adversary values, very often mobile or fleeting targets. It's extremely challenging and it requires nearly perfect information flow.

One technological solution to that challenge might be Network Centric Collaborative Targeting which is Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration funded by the Secretary of Defense's office, initially designed to respond to the targeting challenges the Coalition experienced in Kosovo. The goal is to take all of our Battlespace Awareness assets – and by the way, there are a lot more out there than if you just think about intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – you open it up exponentially if you are able to take things in – and you make them work together automatically.

Smart software that knows the capabilities of each platform automatically orders a wide variety of assets to acquire information on priority targets set by the warfighting commander. The software weighs and assesses the information, then automatically tasks other Battlespace Awareness assets to fill in gaps in information. The key is that we're using our technology to tighten our decision cycle, turning information into desired effects very, very quickly, which is the crux of that Asymmetric Advantage I've been talking about.

Similar network centric type systems could work for combat search and rescue or missile defense, or you can just go on and on. We're looking for more ideas for automatically sharing and fusing information in Joint Expeditionary Forces Experiment 04 later this year. I think it's late July and August, and I know some of you are probably designing this.

I've spoken a lot about our Asymmetric Advantage and that's certainly based on our technology. And to a large part, that's due to you right here. And I thank you for that.

The partnership we have between the military and the defense industry is one of our greatest National assets. Of course, we still have technical issues to solve like bandwidth, how to make things smaller and batteries, for instance. But, perhaps even more important is developing the mindset that values information sharing and redrawing the lines in our organizational charts to better take advantage of our tremendous technology.

Let me ask you a couple quick questions before we go to Q&A. This is a very scientific poll, so please pay attention. How many folks here are contractors or guests of defense contractors? OK, very many hands. Next question: How many of you have a defense Command and Control contract with one of the military services or OSD? Not quite as many hands. OK, how many have a similar contract with the Department of Homeland Security? OK, fewer hands. How about with the DC Metro Police Department? I've got half-a-hand over here. OK, last question, this is the real proof: How about the Florida Intercoastal Waterway Police? I'm not seeing any hands now.

That's really what I'm talking about when I say new ways of thinking. It has nothing to do with technology. We can make that available. The key is thinking more broadly about opportunities to share and integrate at new levels, a new mindset that I say is required for the environment that we're in.

How many of the folks in this room know anything about JPEN? If you don't know about JPEN, then you've got to go take a look at it. The Joint Protection Enterprise Network, it can be focused on anything, but right now, we're focused on security at military installations. We figured out some years ago that we didn't really have a good way to share information between our militaries on force protection issues. For example, if a suspicious-looking vehicle is denied entry to Fort Belvoir, that event will be logged by the United States Army at Fort Belvoir. What do you think the probability of that information getting to Fort Myer, or Andrews or Bolling is? It's not easy to get there – it might be in an email or letter somewhere or a report. So, we had some really smart people come up with a solution, JPEN. If you haven't seen it you really ought to go see it. It's really quite interesting.

It was relatively cheap; it was also off-the-shelf software that was modified. It was born Joint from the beginning. It took 90 days to get from the idea to a prototype and another 60 days to get 30 bases and headquarters equipped. NORTHCOM operates it. I think we need to continue that type of information sharing outside the military; it's got to go beyond just military installations. It's sharing information that is already out there, the kind of information you'd like to know if you're an installation commander somewhere.

So, it's that kind of thinking we're looking for to keep our Asymmetric Advantage. We really do have one. It's ultimately a cultural change, which I've been talking about all day, a change in mindset where we actively look for opportunities to integrate between agencies, with allies and others. And we need to look hard at old procedures and other roadblocks to sharing information. That's what it comes down to, as you know very well.

I want to shift gears a bit. We're obviously troubled by the allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq. We're dealing with it aggressively. I don't think I need to remind this group but I'll remind you anyway, that 99.9999% of our troops have the highest standards, and they're wearing the uniform with honor.

Many of you know from first hand experience because either you're a company who has people forward in Afghanistan or Iraq, or you're in uniform and you know people over there. Let me tell you that the men and women in the Armed Forces, DoD civilians, diplomatic civilians, industry partners over there are really doing great work. They're making a huge difference.

We're part of an international coalition that's, I think, absolutely terrific, but the C4BA of the United States of America – the Command and Control that we bring to the team – allows us to do amazing things to make this world a safer place. It really does come down to our command and control that allows us to make this world a safer place for our children, for our grandchildren, to keep them free from fear. In my mind, that's the bottom line and that's why you work so hard at what you do. So, thanks again for having me here today.